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Abstract 
 
This paper critically examines the ‘admittance’ of the Ottoman Empire as 
the first non-European and non-Christian state into European international 
society, challenges the idea that international society had a universal 
character, and explores how the Empire encountered and adapted to the 
requirements of this society. There are two premises to explore. First, the 
Empire was never accepted as an equal member of the European society 
of states. Second, the Ottoman Empire’s desire to enter European 
international society initiated its modernisation, which gradually led to the 
emergence of Turkish nationalism in the twentieth century. The first part 
of this paper deals with the ‘otherness’ of the Ottoman Empire within 
European international society. The second part explains the paradoxical 
character of Ottoman–European relations, which initiated the Empire’s 
modernisation. The last part explores the emergence of Turkish 
nationalism in relation to the policies of Ottoman modernisation that 
brought the transition from an Islamic empire into a modern secular 
nation-state. It concludes by questioning whether or not the modern 
Turkish state is considered a European member of international society. 
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The requirements of European international 
society: Modernity and nationalism in the 
Ottoman Empire 
AYLA GÖL1
INTRODUCTION 
The expansion of international society has become one of the dominant 
themes of the English School within the discipline of international 
relations (IR). The idea that the ‘West’ was keenly engaged in establishing 
relations with ‘other’ societies has usually been presented from the 
perspective of European states by Western scholars. It was indeed an 
expansion of Western norms, values and institutions to non-European 
states. However, non-European states experienced this expansion rather 
differently, in that they had to fulfil certain entry requirements. The 
Ottoman Empire is a most interesting sociological case study not only to 
challenge the idea that international society had a universal character but 
also to test how far this society was able to affect the behaviour of a non-
European state.  
The first premise of this paper is that the Ottoman Empire was never 
accepted as an equal member of the European society of states even after it 
was formally admitted to the Concert of Europe in 1856. Before its 
admittance, the Ottoman Empire had always been in contact with European 
states through warfare, trade and diplomacy because of its geographical 
proximity. The Empire had an ambiguous status within the European state 
system due to its different socio-political organisation and religion but it 
never really became a full member of international society. The Ottomans 
became the first ‘other’ by which Europeans differentiated themselves from 
those outside of Europe when they were defining a collective European 
identity.  
1  John Vincent Fellow, Department of International Relations, Research School of Pacific and Asian 
Studies, The Australian National University. I am grateful to Heather Rae, Paul Keal, Joel Quirk, 
Shogo Suzuki, Thuy Do, and Michelle Burgis for their helpful comments and assistance.  
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The second premise of this paper is that the Ottoman Empire’s desire to 
enter European international society initiated its modernisation, which 
gradually led to the emergence of Turkish nationalism in the twentieth 
century. Ottoman–European relations had a paradoxical character, which is 
a neglected dimension of the expansion of international society. On the one 
hand, the Empire’s modernising elite did not anticipate that these policies 
would create the historical conditions for the rise of nationalism which 
contributed towards the Empire’s end. On the other hand, their initial aim to 
catch up with European technological development started an irreversible 
historical process towards the path of European modernity. 
In the first part of this paper, I argue that European identity as the basic 
notion of international society was defined against the Ottoman Empire 
through much of European history. The second part will explain how 
domestic reforms and foreign relations were intertwined during the 
Empire’s participation in international society. The last part will explore 
how Ottoman–European relations influenced the socio-political structure of 
the Islamic Empire within which Turkish nationalism and modern nation-
state emerged. 
THE ‘OTHERNESS’ OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE IN EUROPEAN 
INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 
The concept of international society can be found in the classic writings of 
Hedley Bull, Martin Wight, Adam Watson and John Vincent, all well-
known representatives of the English School.2 These scholars characterised 
a society of states that originated in Europe as based on common norms, 
values and institutions. Their discussions not only contributed to the 
development of the English School within IR theory but also introduced a 
particular approach to understanding the expansion of European inter-
national society to non-European states.3 This article does not deal with the 
2  Hedley Bull, Anarchical society: A study of order in world politics, 2nd edn (London: Macmillan, 
1995); Hedley Bull and Adam Watson, eds, The expansion of international society (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1992); Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight, eds, Diplomatic investigations: 
Essays in the theory of international politics (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1966); John R. 
Vincent, Nonintervention and international order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974). 
3  Following the analysis of the English School scholars, the concepts of Europe and the West are used 
interchangeably in this paper. 
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debate among IR scholars about whether the concept of international 
society is a socio-political fact or an academic myth.4 Although I accept the 
existence of international society as presented by the English School I 
attempt to tell a non-European part of the story from an Islamic society’s 
perspective. Theoretically, as Paul Keal argues, the inclusion of non-
Christian and non-European states is ‘a vital but often neglected part of the 
story of international society’.5 The examination of how the Ottoman 
Empire’s status changed from being Europe’s other by the fifteenth century 
to a non-European member of international society in the mid-nineteenth 
century helps us not only to complete at least one neglected part of this 
story, but also to challenge the claim about this society’s universal character. 
According to many English School scholars, the Ottoman Empire was the 
first non-European state to be admitted to international society.6 Its 
‘admission’ was followed by two other non-Christian and non-Western 
civilisations, Japan and China in the mid-nineteenth century, which arguably 
gave European international society a universal character. This under-
standing creates a dilemma since the universal or multi-civilisational 
character of international society contradicts the idea of its Western origin.7 
The ‘admission’ of these non-European states in accordance with the 
requirements of international society can hardly be interpreted as evidence 
of its universal character. As the case of the Ottoman Empire exhibits, the 
conditions to become a member of this society were not compatible with the 
non-European norms, values and institutions of an Islamic state, which had 
to undergo a transformation of its political, social and economic institutions. 
The adjustment of the Empire’s normative and civilisational differences in 
4  Paul Keal, ‘An international society?’, in Greg Fry and Jacinta O’Hagan, eds, Contending images of 
world politics (London: Macmillan, 2000), pp. 61–2. 
5  Ibid., p. 64. 
6  The first important work examining the Ottoman Empire’s relations with European states within the 
English School approach is Thomas Naff, ‘The Ottoman Empire and the European states system’, in 
Bull and Watson, eds, The expansion of international society. However, it was Iver Neumann and 
Jennifer Welsh’s article that introduced a new research agenda for the scholars of international 
society by regarding the Ottoman Empire as the other in the definition of European identity. See Iver 
B. Neumann and Jennifer M. Welsh, ‘The other in European self-definition: An addendum to the 
literature on international society’, Review of International Studies 17(4) 1991, pp. 327–48.  
7  Jacinta O’Hagan, Conceptualising the West in international relations: From Spengler to Said 
(Houndmills: Palgrave, 2000), p. 115.  
4  AYLA GÖL  
 
 
 
accordance with Western rules imply that European international society 
was not actually universal.  
One can argue that between the fifteenth and twentieth centuries, the 
Ottoman Empire was, in realpolitik terms, a significant European power, 
controlling between one-quarter and one-third of the continent at its zenith.8 
‘The paradox is that it was not. Even though a significant portion of the 
Empire was based in Europe, it cannot be said to have been of Europe.’9 
According to Carsten Holbraad, the Ottoman Empire was never really part 
of international society since it was ‘geographically marginal, culturally 
alien and historically hostile’.10 The Ottoman Empire had a different socio-
political organisation—its millet (nation) system—and a different religion to 
European states.11 For the West, the Ottoman Empire was an ‘other’, a non-
Western alien society, which had different principles of existence and values 
from those of Europe.12 Although the Ottoman Empire was never accepted 
as a Western great power it had to be taken into account by all major 
European states as long as it was materially powerful. This caused the 
dilemma of being part of a European international system but not being a 
member of European international society.13 It was in the late fifteenth 
  8  Paul Rich, ‘European identity and the myth of Islam: A reassessment’, Review of International 
Studies 25(3) 1999, pp. 453–74, at p. 443. 
  9  Naff, ‘The Ottoman Empire and the European states system’, p. 143. 
10  Carsten Holbraad, Middle powers in international politics (London: Macmillan, 1984), p. 34. 
11  The millet system was characterised by religious and cultural autonomy of different groups rather 
than ethnic communities or language. Thus, the separation was between Muslims (Turks, Kurds, 
Lazs, Alevis), Christians (Armenians, Greeks), and Jews in the Empire. The number of millets 
changed throughout the Ottoman history. New millets were created as a consequence of pressure 
from the Western great powers. For instance, while there were nine recognised millets, of which six 
were fairly large in 1875, there were seventeen in 1914. Kemal K. Karpat, An inquiry into the social 
foundation of nationalism in the Ottoman states: From social estates to classes, from millets to 
nation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973), pp. 88–98.  
12  The conceptual pair of ‘self’/other’ allows a simple dichotomy between ‘us’ and ‘them’ to emerge 
during the process of collective identity formation. Iver B. Neumann, ‘Self and other in international 
relations’, European Journal of International Relations 2(2) 1996, pp. 139–74, at p. 141. 
13  This differentiation is based on Hedley Bull’s classification of system and society in IR literature. 
According to Bull, ‘[a] system of states (or international system) is formed when two or more states 
have sufficient contact between them, and have sufficient impact on one another’s decisions, to 
cause them to behave—at least in some measure—as parts of a whole’. Bull, Anarchical society, 
p. 9. Furthermore, in his analysis, the definition of international society refers to a society of 
sovereign states. ‘A society of states (or international society) exists when a group of states, 
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century that the Empire began to be involved in Europe’s affairs, when it 
was drawn into alliances with Western powers in order to help the Italian 
city-states against their enemies.14 The Ottoman Empire was the only state 
which did not ‘know its place’ in the hierarchy of European powers until the 
mid-nineteenth century. Although it had extensive possessions in the 
Balkans and the Treaty of Paris of 1856 formally admitted it to the Concert 
of Europe, it was never identified as a European state.15 Being a formal part 
of the European system in 1856 did not mean that its sense of self-identity 
was defined as European. Until that time, major historical events such as the 
Crusades, the fall of Constantinople and the sieges of Vienna were empha-
sised to create the collective memory of Europeans, and to some extent still 
exist in their contemporary memories.16  
The capture of Constantinople (İstanbul) by the Muslim Ottomans in 
1453 created a real threat to European security and Christian collective 
identity. Throughout the history of Ottoman–European relations, the fall of 
Constantinople and later the Ottoman sieges of Vienna in 1529 and 1683 
became symbolic historical events that played important roles in shaping a 
collective memory and identity among European states. Thus, the Ottomans 
were the first non-Europeans to counter an ‘us’ and ‘them’ dichotomy while 
creating a European collective identity that is one of the basic notions of 
international society. When Constantinople fell, Ottoman historians con-
sidered this event as the beginning of a ‘new era’ (Yeni Çağ) in their history, 
signalling their military superiority. European rulers and observers, on the 
contrary, did not credit the role of the well-organised and disciplined army 
of Sultan Mehmet II but used the image of ‘dangerous Ottoman-Turk’ at the 
conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they 
conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and 
share in the working of common institutions.’ He then argues that the members of an international 
society are bound by certain common interests, common values and certain rules. ‘At the same time 
they co-operate in the working of institutions such as the forms of procedures of international law, 
the machinery of diplomacy and general international organisation, and the customs conventions of 
war.’ Bull, Anarchical society, p. 13.  
14  Naff, ‘The Ottoman Empire and the European states system’, p. 145. 
15  F. R. Bridge and R. Bullen, The great powers and the European states system 1815–1914 (London: 
Longman, 1980), p. 3. 
16  Edward W. Said, Orientalism: Western conceptions of the Orient (London: Penguin, 1995), p. 75. 
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doorstep of Europe to defend the Christian faith and define its identity.17 
Although the political identity of Western Europe was based on the concept 
of ‘Christendom’ rather than ‘Europe’, these terms slowly became 
interchangeable as a result of the Islamic Ottoman threat. After the fall of 
Constantinople, the statement of Pope Pius III in identifying Europe with 
Christendom in 1458 had not only a symbolic meaning but also played an 
important role in the construction of a European collective identity.18 The 
fact that the Christian communities and churches of Asia Minor—Anatolia 
(Anadolu)—were no longer under Christendom but infidel Ottoman rule 
which was not ‘European’ became another determining factor in ‘othering’ 
the Ottomans.19  
Most analyses of the Ottoman Empire’s identity and status in inter-
national society are generally presented from the perspective of both 
Western states’ interests and Western scholars. Such works usually 
regard the relationship between the European states and the Ottoman 
Empire as the longest and most equal of all European relations with 
non-European states. As Wight pointed out, ‘the politics of the defence 
of Europe against the [Ottoman] Turks were religious politics ... The 
rulers of the West regarded the [Ottoman] Turks with fear and disgust as 
a barbarian intruder, and revived the idea of a crusade to deliver the 
Balkans and the Near East from the infidel’.20 His emphasis was more 
on religious politics than identity politics. The idea that European 
identity developed in relation to the existence of the Ottoman Empire as 
the dangerous ‘other’ has been put on the research agenda of 
international society scholars recently. From a different perspective, 
Edward Said also emphasised that Islam was a source of European fear, 
within which the Ottoman Empire represented a ‘constant danger’ for 
the whole of Christian civilisation until the end of the seventeenth 
17  Iver B. Neumann, Uses of the other: ‘The East’ in European identity formation (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1999), p. 45. 
18  Stuart Hall, ‘The West and the rest: Discourse and power’, in Stuart Hall and Bram Gieben, eds, 
Formations of modernity (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), p. 289. 
19  Ibid., p. 326. 
20  Martin Wight, Power politics (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1978), p. 302. 
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century.21 Thus, the role of the Ottomans as the other in defining 
European collective identity is the first neglected dimension of the 
conventional English School approach.  
From the Western point of view, the Ottoman Empire was not regarded 
as a European state. But there is another side of the coin as well: it was not 
necessary for the Ottomans to be part of the society of European states at 
the zenith of its imperial power since Ottoman civilisation was seen as 
superior to that of the Europeans. From the Ottoman point of view, the West 
was also the ‘other’ (kafir – infidel) in terms of its different socio-political 
structure and religion. The Ottoman Sultan was accepted as the head of the 
Muslims, the Caliph, the successor of the prophet Mohammed.22 As a 
consequence of this belief, ‘Ottomanisation’ also signified ‘Islamisation’ 
and its self-identity was that of the ‘protector’ of the Muslim world against 
the ‘infidel’ Christian world. Arguably, the Ottoman Sultans considered 
themselves superior to their Western counterparts and chose to exclude the 
Empire from the European society of states. Although the Ottoman Empire 
accepted Western ambassadors to Istanbul at certain times for limited 
periods, Ottoman ambassadors were not sent to European states until the 
eighteenth century, demonstrating that they did not understand such 
exchanges to be reciprocal. However, the Sultans had to change their 
perceptions of the West in order to survive with the help of European allies 
when the Empire started declining in the mid-seventeenth century.  
When the Ottoman Empire was drawn into the politics of European 
states and reluctantly decided to be a member of international society in the 
mid-nineteenth century, it was not easy for either the European states or the 
Ottoman Empire to define the Empire’s identity and place within this 
society. In fact, the first sign of the Ottoman Empire’s involvement in 
European affairs was in 1536 when Francis I of France allied himself with 
the Ottoman Sultan before launching an attack on Italy. However, this 
involvement was short-lived. A more radical shift in European politics 
21  Said, Orientalism, p. 59. Said explains how the ‘orient’ played an important role as the other in 
defining Europe on a very large historical and geographical scale. During this process, the difference 
between ‘East’ and ‘West’ based on cultural domination and social power created a new discourse of 
‘Orientalism’. 
22  Eric J. Hobsbawm, The age of empire: 1875–1914 (London: Abacus, 1994), p. 278. 
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occurred in the seventeenth century. The emergence of the Westphalian 
political order in Europe in 1648 and the defeat of Ottoman forces in the 
Vienna siege of 1683 decreased the role of the perceived Islamic threat to 
European identity and security. The first defeat of the Ottomans by the 
victorious Christian powers, the Holy League, at Carlowitz in 1699 was a 
turning point in Ottoman–European relations: while Europeans gained self-
confidence about their military superiority, they also decided to invite ‘the 
dangerous Ottoman-Turk’, for the first time, to participate in a European 
congress.23 The subsequent Treaty of Utrecht in 1714 became the last treaty 
to refer to the notion of respublica Christiana in European collective 
identity as the medieval idea of ‘Christendom’ subsequently lost its power 
in political thought.24  
As European politics became increasingly secularised throughout the 
eighteenth century, Britain and France established close relations with the 
Ottoman Empire as an integral part of their political and economic interests. 
The Ottoman defeat by the Russians in the war of 1768–74 led the 
Ottomans to recognise that they needed European allies to protect the 
integrity of the Empire. Although the Ottoman rulers decided to develop 
close relations with the ‘infidel’ European states, this was not an easy task. 
They had to fulfil ‘the standard of civilisation’, which was proclaimed as the 
criteria of membership of international society by the European great 
powers. The notions of legitimacy, international law and mutual recognition 
played an important role in determining which state would be included or 
excluded within the ‘civilised’ international society.25  
The 1853 Crimean War between the Russians and the Ottomans 
concluded with the Treaty of Paris in 1856 and had a distinctive meaning 
for Ottoman history.26 On the one hand, it emphasised the continual 
disintegration and decline of the Empire; on the other, the Empire was 
23  Neumann, Uses of the other, p. 51. 
24  Rich, ‘European identity and the myth of Islam’, pp. 442–3. 
25  Keal, ‘An international society?’, p. 69. 
26  In Article VII of the Treaty of Paris (1856) the signatory states solemnly declared the Sublime Porte 
admitted participation in the advantages of the Public Law and System of Europe. Robert H. 
Jackson, Quasi-states: Sovereignty, international relations and the Third World (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 63. 
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admitted as a power into the European society of states.27 As Karl Polanyi 
argues, its ‘admission’ was granted when the integrity of the Ottoman 
Empire was declared essential to the equilibrium of Europe in 1856. The 
Concert of Europe subsequently tried to maintain the integrity of the 
Empire. After 1878, its dismemberment would also be provided in a 
similarly orderly manner when its disintegration was deemed essential to 
that equilibrium.28 It was after the Treaty of Paris that the Ottoman 
government—Bab-ı Ali (Sublime Porte)— recognised that it had to develop 
close economic, political and ideological relations with the European states 
in order to preserve the Empire’s existence in the international system. After 
1856, the Sublime Porte accepted the three main requirements of European 
international society in order to protect the independence of the Ottoman 
state.29 In fact, it was a matter of survival as well as a desire to become an 
equal member of the society of European states.  
First, the Treaty of Paris forced the Sublime Porte to repudiate the 
Islamic character of the state. By doing so, the Empire started acting more 
like a secular dynastic state on the European model of the state system. The 
repudiation of the Empire’s Islamic character was interpreted by the 
Sublime Porte as accepting all the subjects of the Empire, of whatever 
religion, as equal, and ensuring that it should be so regarded by other actors 
in domestic politics.  
Second, in relation to the first requirement, the Sublime Porte had to 
accept modern arguments on the principle of nationality, or of national self-
determination. This created a paradox in Ottoman politics since the 
acceptance of these principles threatened the Empire’s integrity by leading 
to the disintegration of the millet system. More remarkably, statesmen 
started using modern secular arguments about the legitimacy of the existing 
Ottoman regime. This necessitated using the European notion of public law, 
27  İlber Ortaylı, İmparatorluğun en uzun Yüzyılı [The longest century of the Ottoman Empire] 
(İstanbul: Hil Yayınları, 1987), p. 90. 
28  Karl Polanyi, The great transformation: The political and economic origins of our time (Boston: 
Beacon Press, 1957), p. 8. 
29  Roderic H. Davison, ‘The Westernisation of Ottoman diplomacy in the nineteenth century’, in 
Edward Ingram, ed., National and international politics in the Middle East: Essays in honour of Elie 
Kedourie (London: Frank Cass, 1986), pp. 56–9. 
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because that law tended to support the status quo which the Sublime Porte 
wanted to preserve.  
Third, if the Empire wanted to be part of the European society of states 
on equal terms, it had to observe European international law. The Islahat 
Fermanı (Reform Decree) of 1856 was a reflection of these requirements in 
domestic politics. The document emphasised full equality for all subjects.30 
‘Surely, the Ottomans did not offer equal rights to their subjects—a 
meaningless anachronism in the context of that time and place. They did 
however offer a degree of tolerance without precedent or parallel in 
Christian Europe.’31 In fact, the Sublime Porte, during the reign of Sultan 
Abdulmecid (1839–61), accepted these requirements in order to become an 
equal member of the European society of states and to protect the 
independence of the state. Paradoxically, these attempts brought about the 
demise of the Ottoman Empire.  
The second neglected dimension of the expansion of international society 
is, therefore, to explain how the Empire’s socialisation into this society 
affected not only its foreign relations but also its domestic politics. The 
following section will explore four phases of Ottoman history, which will 
show how close relations with European states initiated the modernisation 
of the Empire both before and after 1856: the era of military reform, the 
Tanzimat (political reforms) period, the movement of the Young Ottomans, 
and the revolution of the Young Turks. Between the eighteenth century and 
the end of the First World War, the history of the Ottoman Empire was 
shaped by the policies of modernisation in accordance with the main 
purpose of preserving the Empire’s integrity. During these periods, the 
character of the state had gone through a transformation from theocracy and 
absolutism to a secular and constitutional republic in order to become a 
recognised member of European international society. The next section, 
therefore, aims to explain how the Empire’s relations with European states 
30  Elie Kedourie, Politics in the Middle East (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 37; Robert 
Matran, ed., Osmanlı imparatorluğu tarihi [The history of the Ottoman Empire] Vol. 2 (İstanbul: 
Remzi, 1995), pp. 110–13. 
31  Bernard Lewis, What went wrong? The clash between Islam and modernity in the Middle East 
(London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2002), p. 33. 
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initiated the policies of Ottoman modernisation that paradoxically 
contributed towards its disintegration. 
THE PARADOXICAL CHARACTER OF OTTOMAN–EUROPEAN 
RELATIONS AND MODERNISATION 
Before developing close diplomatic relations in the nineteenth century 
which would eventually initiate the Ottoman Empire’s modernisation, 
interaction between the Empire and European states mainly occurred 
through warfare. After their major defeat at Carlowitz in 1699 the 
Ottomans had to learn new concepts and new ways of dealing with 
European states.32 Most historians agree that the primary weakness of the 
Ottoman state was its ‘inability to adapt to the military technology of 
Europe’.33 Consequently, either the viability of the Ottoman system had to 
be questioned or the superiority of European military technology had to be 
recognised.34 As Bernard Lewis argues, the question was not only ‘what 
were the Ottomans doing wrong?’ but also ‘what were the Europeans 
doing right?’ More importantly, the essential question was ‘how do we 
catch up with them, and resume our rightful primacy?’ These questions 
led to the acceptance of a shocking idea to Muslims; that they might learn 
from the previously despised ‘inferior infidel’. The Ottoman Sultans 
Selim III (1789–1807) and Mahmud II, the Reformer (1808–39) were the 
first to acknowledge this.35  
Military reform 
The need for modernisation of the Ottoman Empire was initially intended 
to be limited to military technology only. Military reform with the primary 
purpose of strengthening state power gradually required the import of 
other ‘infidel’ technological developments. During the reign of Sultan 
Selim III, the reforms of the Nizami Cedit (New Order) period dictated 
that a new army be set up and new military schools were opened. 
32  Ibid., pp. 17–18. 
33  Fernand Braudel, Civilisation and capitalism: 15th–18th century, Vol. III: The perspective of the 
world (London: Collins, 1984), p. 482. 
34  Şerif Mardin, Türk modernleşmesi [Turkish modernisation] (İstanbul: İletişim, 1991), p. 12. 
35  Lewis, What went wrong?, p. 25. 
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Nevertheless, it was clear that the limited military and technological 
reforms were not enough to prevent the decline of the Empire. The Nizami 
Cedit reforms extended to non-technical areas by recognising the general 
superiority of the West. On the one hand, Selim III recognised the 
importance of being part of European diplomacy and decided to establish 
permanent embassies in major European capitals in 1793.36 On the other 
hand, the Sultan aimed at limiting the influence of the ulema (Muslim 
clergy), which became the principal authority of Islamic life and 
institutions in the Ottoman state and society as the Empire declined. 
However, the need to modernise all Ottoman institutions and concepts 
was only recognised by a small number of enlightened army officers and 
bureaucrats. It was not surprising that the ulema opposed the New Order 
and modernisation attempts. In order to obstruct progressive reforms, the 
ulema used its influence to cooperate with the janissary (yeniçeri) army.37 
Hence, the role of religion and the military became pivotal issues in 
determining both Ottoman/Turkish modernisation and Ottoman/Turkish 
relations with European states. In particular, the Islamic character of the 
Empire became the major obstacle in establishing relations with Europe. 
Sultan Mahmud II was the first reformist monarch in Ottoman history. 
The Sultan was tactical enough to gain the support of the ulema when he 
planned a complete reform of the army. This cooperation between the 
Sultan and religious groups lasted only a short while, until the janissary 
army was abolished in 1826. Mahmud II’s first achievement was to set up a 
new army and train army officers according to European models. The 
second achievement was the more drastic step of depriving the ulema of 
power, preventing them from obstructing modernisation.38 These reforms, 
however, only reduced the influence of religion, but did not eliminate Islam 
from Ottoman society. The modernist army officers and bureaucrats always 
had a clash of interests with religious groups that highlighted the struggle 
between the traditional and the modern in Ottoman/Turkish history.  
36  Neumann, Uses of the other, p. 53. 
37  Suna Kili, ‘Turkey: A case study of political development’, Occasional Papers, School of Business  
Administration and Economics, Robert College (İstanbul: Menteşe Matbaası, 1968), p. 6. 
38  Ibid., p. 7. 
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In fact, Mahmud II’s reforms signalled the beginning of the decay of a 
multinational Empire.39 While the Sultan managed to control the power of 
the ulema, he did not anticipate the rise of nationalism among his subjects. 
His aim of decreasing the role of religion in Ottoman society started a new 
process of change that undermined the structure of the Empire’s religion-
based millet system, which was functional for several centuries. It was not a 
surprise that national sentiments gradually moved into the vacuum created 
by the weakened role of religion in Ottoman socio-political life.  
In general, the nineteenth century can be characterised as a century of 
national unification and the non-Muslim subjects of the Ottoman Empire 
were the first to explore the meaning of nationalist ideology. The Serbs were 
the first collective group to launch a national rising against the Ottomans in 
February 1804. ‘In 1815, a second Serb rising was more successful and won 
them recognition as an autonomous principality under Ottoman suzerainty. 
The Greek uprising a few years later evoked widespread European support 
and achieved a sovereign independent Greek kingdom.’40 In the end, Sultan 
Mahmud II had to accept the independence of Greece, and an autonomous 
Serbia and Egypt.41 These movements were the first signals of the 
emergence of nationalism within the Empire. The impact of nationalism on 
the Empire’s millet system gained a new momentum by the proclamation of 
the Tanzimat era.  
Tanzimat period 
The period from 1839 to 1876 is known in Turkish historiography as the 
era of the Tanzimat, which modernised the Ottoman state and society 
through diplomatic means.42 The Gülhane Hatt-ı Hümayunu (Imperial 
Degree of the Rose-Chamber), which opened a new era of the Tanzimat in 
Ottoman history, was declared in 1839. It was a declaration of certain 
39  Although the Ottoman Empire is described as multinational, the usage of nation (millet) here is 
totally different from the modern usage. 
40  Lewis, What went wrong?, p. 34. 
41  Matran, ed., Osmanlı imparatorluğu tarihi, p. 27. 
42  Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and modern Turkey, 2 Vols 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 55. 
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rights and political reforms, which introduced a new meaning to Ottoman 
citizenship.  
It was a statement of intent on the part of the Ottoman government, 
promising in effect four basic reforms:  
• The establishment of guarantees for the life, honour and property of 
the sultan’s subjects; 
• An orderly system of taxation to replace the system of tax-farming; 
• A system of conscription for the army; and  
• Equality before the law of all subjects, whatever their religion 
(although this was formulated somewhat ambiguously in the 
document).43  
The Tanzimat leaders aimed to reform important institutions of Ottoman 
society at administrative, judicial, financial and educational levels as well as 
the military. They left traditional Islamic institutions such as religious 
schools and courts out of these reforms. Specifically, the continuous 
theocratic nature of the state created a serious obstacle in the development 
of Ottoman–European relations.  
The third neglected dimension of the international society approach is the 
expansion of foreign trade to non-European markets. It is not an historical 
coincidence that the Tanzimat reforms in domestic politics and the system of 
taxation were promised by the Ottoman state after the British became the 
major trading partner with the Anglo-Turkish Convention of 1838.44 The 
English School approach here largely overlooks the fact that political and 
economic changes within the European state system during the nineteenth 
century triggered the political and economic restructuring of the Ottoman 
Empire. The fruits of these changes were seen in the Ottoman Empire 
through the interaction between the Ottoman and European states, particu-
larly in trade and diplomacy. Therefore, the signature of the Treaty of Paris 
43  Erik J. Zürcher, Turkey: A modern history (London: I. B. Taurus, 1993), p. 53. 
44  Donald Quataert, ‘The age of reforms, 1812–1914’, in Halil İnalcık and Donald Quataert, eds, An 
economic and social history of the Ottoman Empire, Vol. 2: 1600–1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1994), p. 764. 
The requirements of European international society   15 
 
 
in 1856 was also related to this economic dimension and should not only be 
interpreted in political terms as the formal admittance of the Ottoman 
Empire into international society. Obviously, when the Ottoman ruling elite 
decided to sign the Treaty they could not anticipate its long-term 
consequences. After this date, the Ottoman interaction with industrialised, 
capitalist and expansionist Europe through trade and diplomacy would 
sound the death-knell of its greatness as an Islamic empire.45 As discussed 
earlier, when the Ottoman rulers accepted the requirements of European 
international society with the Treaty of Paris they had to first repudiate its 
Islamic character, something that would not be easily accepted by certain 
groups of Ottoman society. For the first time in both Ottoman and Western 
societies, the compatibility of Islam with Western values was questioned. 
This compatibility is still a key issue in contemporary relations between 
Western and Islamic states. 
The Young Ottomans 
The Young Ottomans movement (1865–76) emerged as being specifically 
opposed to the era of the Tanzimat. According to Elie Kedourie this 
opposition was an outcome of the political reformation itself.46 ‘They 
were the first organised opposition group from the Ottoman intelligentsia 
to use the ideas of the Enlightenment and attempt to [try] modernisation 
with Islam. They were also the first Ottoman group to use the media as a 
means of spreading their ideology.’47 The Young Ottomans’ criticism 
focused on both the pioneers of the Tanzimat movement and the ideology 
of Westernisation itself. The Young Ottomans believed that the Tanzimat 
movement did not have a solid ideological or ethical basis; instead the 
means to modernise the state could be found in Islam. For the first time 
they emphasised the importance of mobilising the ‘Ottomans’ as a 
conscious group.48 Although the Young Ottomans did not operate within a 
45  Braudel, Civilisation and capitalism, p. 483. 
46  Kedourie, Politics in the Middle East, p. 50. 
47  Hugh Poulton, Top hat, grey wolf and crescent: Turkish nationalism and the Turkish republic 
(London: Hurst & Company, 1997), p. 55. See also Serif Mardin, The genesis of young Ottoman 
thought: A study in the modernization of Turkish political ideas (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1962). 
48  Mardin, Türk modernleşmesi, p. 89. 
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modern understanding of nation and nationalism, they initiated the first 
discussions on this phenomenon, with significant consequences for the 
process of nation-building in modern Turkey. For the first time in 
Ottoman history the concept of vatan (homeland) as a territorially defined 
unit was used. If one considers that the new loyalty to the state in non-
European societies, especially in the Middle East, appeared in the form of 
‘patriotism’, not ‘nationalism’, the importance of vatan becomes clear.49 
They not only suggested that it was possible to save the Empire by 
delinking it from the West, but also questioned the extensive authority of 
the Sultan. Finally, they had an important impact on another group, the 
Young Turks, who were the forefathers of Turkish state-building. 
The requirements of European international society and the penetration 
of Western-style concepts and ideas continued to influence Ottoman politics 
even throughout the authoritarian Abdulhamid II regime (1876–1909). 
Although ‘Islamism’ was seen as a potential solution to save the Empire 
during the last period of the Young Ottomans (1870–76) it became the main 
ideology of absolutist Abdulhamid II rule. In particular, a shift in policy 
away from the Tanzimat ideas occurred when Sultan Abdulhamid II used 
the policy of pan-Islamism that favoured Islam at the expense of the 
Empire’s other religious communities to unite the Empire against external 
and internal threats.50 Despite the fact that Abdulhamid II was an 
authoritarian monarch he ordered the establishment of a commission to 
draft a constitution. The Kanun-i Esasi (first Ottoman constitution) was 
proclaimed on 23 December 1876. This first constitution was not really a 
Western-style constitution but ‘provided for separation of powers much 
more in form than fact, and the institutional changes reflected evolution 
rather than a radical departure from past experience’.51 However, Kanun-i 
Esasi was effective only for one year between 1877 and 1878 during the 
first Ottoman Parliament. When Abdulhamid II dissolved parliament and 
suspended the Ottoman constitution in 1878 his rationale was that the 
49  Bernard Lewis, The shaping of the modern Middle East (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 
p. 75. 
50  Jacob M. Landau, The politics of pan-Islam: Ideology and organisation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1994), pp. 9–10. 
51  Shaw and Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire, p. 175. 
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Ottoman subjects did not have any idea of, and experience with, the 
practices of constitutional government. When the Empire entered the era of 
Abdulhamid II’s despotism, the short-lived experience of constitutional 
government along the lines of the European model left marks in the minds 
of modernist elites.52  
In addition to this short-lived constitutional experience, the ideology of 
nationalism had its own development during the Young Ottomans. 
Education and language were the two important instruments of nationalist 
ideology. The reformation of the state schooling system, which commenced 
during the Tanzimat era, and that of language by the compulsory use of 
demotic Turkish aimed to make the Muslim-subjects of the Empire more 
homogeneous. The impact of Western ideas such as the use of the printing 
press also brought new definitions of identity. The heterogeneous 
populations of the Empire were no longer united by the Ottoman socio-
political identity. In the age of nationalism, a cultural and linguistic 
definition of identity within diverse collective groups brought about the end 
of the millet system.  
The Turks were the last group in the Empire to realise this new process at 
the beginning of the twentieth century. When the press began to discuss the 
concept of being a ‘Turk’ and having Anatolia as the central part of a 
homeland, the basic features for the construction of a modern nation were 
invoked: language, education, press, public opinion, and homeland. 
Moreover, the growth of Armenian and Greek nationalism as non-Muslim 
subjects of the Empire became a catalyst for the raising of Turkish 
consciousness in Anatolia. The notion of being a Turk was seen as 
compatible with the concepts of Ottomanism and Islamism. Interestingly, 
Abdulhamid identified himself as a Turk, even if this view was connected 
with his use of pan-Islam. However, this identification did not stop the 
Young Turks overthrowing his absolutist regime.53
52  Kili, ‘Turkey’, p. 10. 
53  Poulton, Top hat, grey wolf and crescent, pp. 61–3. 
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The Young Turks  
In 1908, a small number of modernist army officers, bureaucrats and 
intellectuals in Salonika (modern Thessalonica), rebelled and declared 
themselves the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), the Young 
Turks, representatives of enlightenment and revolution. They aimed not 
only to end the absolutism of Abdulhamid II but also to restore the 1876 
Constitution and radical reforms to save the Ottoman Empire. The Young 
Turk movement, like that of Young Italy and Young Egypt, was a sign of 
the breakdown in the transmission of political habits from one generation 
to the next. According to Anthony Smith, the use of the word ‘young’ was 
not a coincidence.54 However, even the usage of ‘young’ had different 
implications for the Young Ottomans and the Young Turks. While the 
Young Ottomans called themselves Yeni Osmanlılar (literally means the 
new Ottomans) the Young Turks called themselves Jöntürkler (literally 
means the young Turks) that implied their French inspiration.55 Simply, 
the Young Turks were opposed to their own ancestors, the Ottomans, and 
preferred to look towards Europe.  
The Young Turks aimed to homogenise the Muslim subjects of the 
Empire through changing the millet system and having a Western repre-
sentative-type constitution.56 They emphasised the meaning of ‘Turkism’ 
instead of the previous policies of pan-Ottomanism and pan-Islamism. 
However, the concept of ‘Turk’ in their usage did not have any connotation 
with the notion of a modern nation. The Young Turk movement did not rely 
on any single element of Turkism but on an amalgamation of different 
elements which can be encapsulated in a quotation from the Turkish poet, 
Mehmet Emin (Yurdakul): ‘I am a Turk, my religion and my race are 
noble’.57 Clearly, the first element to differentiate between Muslims and 
non-Muslims within the Empire was religion. The definition of ‘race’ had 
different connotations. For many Young Turks the idea of ‘Turan’ in 
54  Anthony D. Smith, Theories of nationalism (London: Duckworth, 1971), p. 33. 
55  Lewis, What went wrong?, p. 58. 
56  H. Luke, The making of modern Turkey: From Byzantium to Angora (London: Macmillan, 1936), 
p. 131; Heather Rae, State identities and the homogenisation of peoples (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002), p. 163. 
57  Ziya Gökalp, The principles of Turkism (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1968), p. 5. 
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defining the Turkish ‘race’ became a valid inspiration before the First World 
War. The Turkish sociologist Ziya Gökalp used the concept of Turan.58 
Although Turan was originally a Persian word that described the mythical 
enemy of the Persians and the united homeland of the Turkic people it was 
used by the Young Turks to develop the ideology of pan-Turanism.59 The 
idea of pan-Turanism was a desperate solution to ‘unite the Ottomans, the 
Azerbaijan Turks, the Crimean Turks, the Uzbek, the Kipchaks, the Kirghiz, 
and all the other sundered fragments of Turkism into one Turanian nation’.60 
How could they unite with the Turkic peoples of the Russian Empire while 
the Ottoman Empire itself was in the process of dissolution? This idea could 
not go beyond being a utopia. Gökalp shifted the focus from Turan to the 
notion of a modern nation and became the main ideologue of Turkish 
nationalism.61 The new alternative of a Turkish national consciousness as 
opposed to the Ottoman ümmet (umma – religious community) conscious-
ness of the millet system became widespread after the Young Turk 
revolution of 1908.62
The revolution of 1908 accelerated the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. 
The revolutionaries started a new era with a liberal constitution and 
parliamentary system, which were the main institutional characteristics of 
European states. However, their most difficult task was to explain what the 
notions of ‘constitution’, ‘liberty’, and ‘equality’ meant to the uneducated 
peasants of Anatolia. They had a restricted sense of revolution that did not 
58  ‘(Turan) first identified with groups to south-east later ascribed to Turkic elements on northeast 
frontier.’ John A. Armstrong, Nations before nationalism (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 1982), p. xx; Örnekleriyle Türkçe Sözlük [Turkish dictionary with examples], Vol. 4 (Ankara: 
Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1996), p. 2928. 
59  Pan-Turanism aimed to unite all peoples whose origins were extended back to Turan, ‘an undefined 
Shangrai-La-like area in the steppes of Central Asia’. Jacob M. Landau, Pan-Turkism: From 
irredentism to cooperation (London: Hurst & Company, 1995), p. 1. 
60  Elie Kedourie, ‘Introduction’, in Elie Kedourie, ed., Nationalism in Asia and Africa (London: 
Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1970), p. 51.  
61  See Uriel Heyd, Foundations of Turkish nationalism: The life and teachings of Ziya Gökalp 
(London: Luzac, 1950); Niyazi Berkes, ‘Ziya Gökalp: His contribution to Turkish nationalism’, 
Middle East Journal 8(4) 1954, pp. 375–90. 
62  Ellen K. Trimberger, Revolution from above: Military bureaucrats and development in Japan, 
Turkey, Egypt and Peru (New Jersey: Transaction Books, 1978), p. 86. 
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aim to reform the socio-economic structure of the Empire. However, its 
effects would be felt in the long term: Turkish nationalism had developed as 
an unintended consequence of the modernisation of the Ottoman state. 
While the Ottoman modernist elite decided to reform the Empire, their 
initial aim was to preserve the Empire’s integrity, not to promote the 
separatist tendencies of different nationalists, including Turks. The need to 
take the Empire to the nationalist path could not come about within the 
existing social order. Although the European concepts of equality, 
sovereignty and legitimacy were still alien to the Ottoman state, its subjects 
came into contact with these ideas as a consequence of the Empire’s 
relations with European states. While the non-Muslim subjects of the 
Empire were introduced to the ideology of nationalism in the nineteenth 
century, its Muslim subjects, Turks, Kurds and Arabs, had to wait until the 
beginning of the twentieth century. As Said reminds us, the ‘Oriental claims 
for political independence’ were encouraged by the Western Allied powers 
during the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire.63 Ironically, the 
Empire’s participation in European international society in order to protect 
its independence and integrity paved the way for its own destruction at the 
end of the First World War.  
In conjunction with this paradoxical character of Ottoman–European 
relations, the domestic conditions for the rise of Turkish nationalism were 
set up through the policies of modernisation. The Young Turk regime’s 
commitment to modernisation, in fact, meant an implementation of the 
reform process from above, which served to strengthen the administrative 
power of the state in an authoritarian way. The most influential aspects of 
the socio-political reforms can be summarised as follows: the acceptance of 
the freedom of the press, which emphasised the existence of print 
capitalism; the idea that political parties were the major actors of the 
Empire’s political structure; and the enforcement of the use of the Turkish 
language in schools.64 These reforms served to create a homogeneous 
Turkish nation in the long term. Before the outbreak of the First World War, 
the Balkan Wars of 1912–13 were a turning point in Ottoman history. When 
the Balkan states gained their independence, the Empire lost not only the 
63  Said, Orientalism, p. 248. 
64  Shaw and Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire, p. 279. 
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majority of its territories in Europe but also its multi-religious character. The 
CUP government’s reaction to these losses was a formulation of drastic 
policies that combined their enlightened authoritarianism with ‘chauvinist 
nationalism’. The conditions of the First World War created reasons and 
means under the name of national unity and survival for the CUP leadership 
to implement the policies of ‘homogenisation and Turkification’.65 The 
deportation and massacre of the Armenians in 1915 was a result of both 
internal and external factors that served to facilitate the Young Turks 
regime’s goal of creating a homogeneous national state.66  
Although the CUP regime prepared the conditions for the creation of a 
modern Turkish nation-state, it could not complete its implementation. After 
the First World War, the nationalist group under the leadership of Mustafa 
Kemal Atatürk eventually ‘brought this process to a logical end, having also 
profited from the mistakes of their predecessors’.67 The nationalist group 
not only aimed to reform the administrative and military institutions of the 
Empire as had its predecessors, but also to transform its political, economic 
and social structures into a modern state. Their understanding of the national 
project meant the complete rejection of the Empire. Priority in the national 
project was given to two areas: the definition of a territorial state and the 
creation of a homogenised nation through diplomatic means. The next 
section explains why Turkish nationalist elites preferred the construction of 
a secular nation-state to the protection of an Islamic empire and how they 
replaced the Empire’s anachronistic millet system with the approved 
European model at the end of the First World War. 
THE EMERGENCE OF TURKISH NATIONALISM AND ITS 
MODERNITY 
When the Ottoman Empire collapsed at the end of the First World War its 
traditional identity both at state and societal levels also eroded. As 
discussed in the previous section, the policies of the Young Ottomans and 
Young Turks had an important consequence: the idea of nationality 
65  Rae, State identities and the homogenisation of peoples, pp. 151–3. 
66  Ibid., p. 125. 
67  Mardin, Türk modernleşmesi, p. 201. 
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developed dialectically as an antithesis of a multinational Islamic empire. 
The time was ripe for Muslim subjects of the Empire in Anatolia to meet 
the ideology of nationalism and define the meaning of ‘Turk’. In order to 
understand this development, the level of analysis is based upon a broad 
historical framework within which the relationship between the needs for 
modernisation and the emergence of nationalism is examined. In this 
article, nationalism is regarded as an ideology; a modern phenomenon to 
create an identity; and social and political engineering, which constitutes a 
political community thorough the agent of a nation-state. This 
understanding of nationalism relates its emergence to modernity.68 In the 
light of these explanations, the emergence of Turkish nationalism is 
related to the epoch of modernity for the following three reasons. 
First, the ideology of Turkish nationalism aimed to create a modern 
political identity. The need to belong to a separate Turkish nation was the 
result of the erosion of the traditional ‘Ottoman’ identity at the end of the 
First World War. There was no conscious idea of Turkishness before the 
twentieth century—the issue was ‘Ottomanisation’. In general, there is a 
tendency among Western scholars to use the geographical term ‘Turkey’ in 
referring both to the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic.69  The 
68  In general, the terms ‘modern’, ‘modernisation’, and ‘modernity’ have been used interchangeably in 
characterising social changes of non-European societies since the 1960s. In this article, the concept 
of modernity describes the common technological, political, economic, and social characteristics of 
an historical epoch and the concept of modernisation describes the process by which non-European 
societies acquired these characteristics. This process has been described, not only as 
‘modernisation’, but also as ‘Europeanisation’ and ‘Westernisation’. The term modernity is therefore 
the broader context, which denotes the historical epoch that began in Western Europe with a series of 
profound socio-political transformations in the seventeenth century and reached its maturity with the 
age of Enlightenment and the rise of the industrial revolution. 
69  For instance Eric J. Hobsbawm writes that Egypt won its independence from Turkey in the 
nineteenth century. Eric J. Hobsbawm, The age of revolution: Europe 1789–1848 (London: 
Cardinal, 1973), p. 177. However, the international identity was the Ottoman Empire at that time, 
not Turkey. Interestingly enough, the name Turchia (Türkiye – Turkey) was given to the Anatolian 
territories (Asia Minor) and people by Westerners during the Crusades in the eleventh century. The 
name of the state was Osmanlı Devleti (the Ottoman state) and it was insulting to call the Ottomans 
as Turks, since the Turks were Anatolian peasants within the Empire. The term ‘Ottoman’ was used 
to describe the nobility of the Sultanate. Conversely, the Anatolian Turks almost never used this term 
until the end of the Ottoman Empire in the twentieth century. Bozkurt Güvenç, Türk kimligi: Kültür 
tarihinin kaynakları [The Turkish identity: The sources of cultural history] (Ankara: Kültür 
Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1994), pp. 22–3. Some Western Turkish specialists do not use the terms 
interchangeably, emphasising that an ‘Ottoman’ is not the same as a ‘Turk’. See Bernard Lewis, The 
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Ottoman and Turk are not the same political identities. The equation of 
these two terms became apparent only when Turkish nationalism emerged 
in the twentieth century.70 ‘Until the end of the nineteenth century, the 
concept of being a “Turk,” as used in modern parlance, was alien to the 
Ottoman elite, who saw themselves as Ottomans (Osmanlı) rather than 
“Turks”; the latter seems to have implied “uneducated peasants”’ of 
Anatolia.71 The dual usage also creates confusion about the political identity 
of a modern state and nation. If we accept Ottoman and Turk as the same 
identity, the process of transition from an Islamic imperial identity to a 
modern secular one is obscured, leaving us with an incomplete under-
standing of Turkish nationalism and its modernity.  
Second, Turkish nationalism developed in parallel to the idea of 
constructing a new political identity represented by a modern nation-state, 
as the most prominent political form of modernity. The whole process of 
modernisation spanned almost one and a half centuries, which commenced 
with the declaration of Sened-i İttifak (Document of Agreement) in 1808 
and terminated with the declaration of the Turkish Republic as a secular 
nation-state on 29 October 1923. Scrutiny of four historical periods during 
the Ottoman modernisation—military reform, the Tanzimat, the Young 
Ottomans and the Young Turks—shows that each period laid the 
foundations for the next one. The first period of military reform gradually 
brought the import of other European technological developments, which 
initiated the Empire’s modernisation during the Tanzimat era. In the second 
period, the Young Ottomans opposed to the secular character of the 
Tanzimat believed that modernisation was compatible with Islam. They 
found a synthesis in pan-Islamism to provide an alternative as a stabilising 
factor among all the Muslim subjects during the Empire’s attempts at 
modernisation. In the third period of modernisation, following pan-Islam’s 
failure, the Young Turks focused on pan-Turkism after 1913, which empha-
sised national values and campaigned ‘for an alliance of all Turkish/Turkic 
emergence of modern Turkey, 2nd edn (London: Oxford University Press for the Royal Institute of 
International Affairs, 1968); Shaw and Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire. 
70  Smith, Theories of nationalism, p. 56. 
71  Poulton, Top hat, grey wolf and crescent, p. 43. 
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groups, within the Empire and outside it’.72 The final stage was Turkish 
nationalism as the Young Turks’ major ideology which, under their 
successor Atatürk, became the basis of modern nation-state building.73  
Third, the emergence of Turkish nationalism also coincided with the need 
for modernisation in the Ottoman Empire. In particular, the idea of having a 
separate Turkish nation was directly related to the development of 
communication and print capitalism as part of the modernisation policies. 
The establishment of the printing press was the key development which 
enabled the translation of Western books into Turkish and the distribution of 
Western ideas through newspapers. The first Turkish printing press was 
established by Ibrahim Muteferrika in 1729. One of the earliest books he 
published in the Ottoman language explained the successes of Christian 
military arms against the Ottomans and drew attention to attempts to re-
structure Ottoman military institutions along European lines.74 The press 
was closed in 1742 until it resumed printing in 1784 with the order (ferman) 
of the Sultan. Its publications covered fields such as Ottoman history, 
geography, and language. The opening of a state-sponsored printing press at 
the School of Engineering and Artillery in 1795 was a sign of developments 
in printing that would affect the modernisation of political institutions and 
the Empire’s social structure.75 For instance, ‘the French Embassy in 
Istanbul brought in the message of the Revolution in the Gazette Francaise 
de Constantinople, established in 1795 and addressed the French-speaking 
community and of course those who had learned to read French’.76 
Although printing was permitted for the non-Muslim millets in Hebrew, 
72  Landau, The politics of pan-Islam, p. 9. 
73  Masami Arai, Jön türk dönemi türk milliyetçiliği [Turkish nationalism during the Young Turk era] 
(İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1992), p. 20; E. J. Zürcher, The unionist factor: The role of the 
Committee of Union and Progress in the Turkish national movement, 1905–1926 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 
1984), p. 23. 
74  Lewis, What went wrong?, p. 28. 
75  On 7 October 1808, the Ottoman notion of sovereignty was challenged with the signature of the 
Sened-i İttifak (Document of Agreement) despite the fact that it did not last long. For details of the 
seven clauses in the agreement, see Shaw and Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire, p. 2. For the 
first time, the gradual separation of the Ottoman state from the Sultan was introduced legally. Fatma 
Müge Göcek, Rise of the bourgeoisie, demise of empire: Ottoman Westernisation and social change 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 65. 
76  Lewis, What went wrong?, p. 50. 
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Greek or other European languages it was forbidden for the Muslim-
subjects of the Empire until the 1700s. ‘Even after it was permitted, printing 
in Turkish was not common until the 1800s’.77 The development of print 
capitalism—i.e. the publishing of books and newspapers—and the use of a 
standardised language in printing would have a profound impact on the 
sense of collective identity in the long term.78 For example, the 
standardisation of the Turkish language through the replacement of the 
Arabic alphabet with the Latin alphabet in 1928 severed the link not only 
with the Ottoman language, but also with the past, recognising Turkish 
nationhood as opposed to being Ottoman. The main difficulty was 
transforming the Ottoman umma identity to a secular one during this 
process of imagination. 
As explained earlier, the traditional Ottoman identity was based on the 
millet system, within which there was a differentiation between Muslim and 
non-Muslim subjects but no official differentiation among the Muslim 
ümmets (umma) by language or ethnicity. ‘Ethnicity’ was not a determining 
factor per se. For instance, many grand vezirs and high officials who came 
from Albania were Slav Muslims or other Muslim subjects. In the Ottoman 
system, the concept of the ‘slave elite’ (the ruling official class) and the 
devşirme system (recruitment of Christian boys to be trained as janissaries) 
worked against an ‘ethnically pure’ governing class. In terms of language 
ties, the common language of Muslim subjects was not only Turkish. The 
state language was Osmanlıca (Ottoman language), which was a mixture of 
Turkish, Arabic and Persian. Meanwhile, while the sacred language of the 
ulema was Arabic, the local language of Anatolian peasants was Turkish. 
‘Those who did speak Turkish did not identify themselves principally as 
Turks. Their primary mark of self-identification was their local community 
of farmers, nomads, or city-people—or Islam as the great brotherhood of 
believers.’79 In particular, the religious character of the Ottoman state 
prevented the use of ethnic and language ties in defining the meaning of 
77  Philip D. Curtin, The world and the West: The European challenge and the overseas responses in the 
age of empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 178. 
78  Benedict Anderson, Imagined communities: Reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism 
(London: Verso, 1994). 
79  Curtin, The world and the West, p. 177. 
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Turkishness since Islam was a stronger unifying force than the other two 
ties. 
For the Turkish nationalist elite, it was easier to get rid of the traditional 
Ottoman identity than the Muslim umma identity since ‘the Ottomans came 
to be hated by Turkish-speakers as apostates’.80 They were aware that 
changing the umma identity of Muslim subjects to a secular identity was 
their most challenging task. In Ottoman society, religion functioned both as 
a kind of social cement to hold Muslims together and as a form of 
legitimacy to maintain an Islamic state. The sense of identity on both state 
and societal levels was torn apart with the disintegration of the Empire. 
Indeed, it was a paradox that the new Turkish nation could not be socially 
constructed without both contradicting and containing the identities of its 
predecessor. The key was in the transformation of the umma identity. On the 
one hand, it was accepted that ‘a “Turk” could be anyone who belonged to 
the Muslim umma during the Ottoman time’.81 On the other hand, one was 
accepted as a Turk as long as one called oneself a Turk within the 
boundaries of the sovereign secular state. Hence, the construction of a new 
Turkish nation was an integral part of the transformation from a caliphate-
empire to a secular-territorial state.  
The Turkish experience in constructing a modern nation-state has been 
accepted by both Turkish and Western scholars as a good example of 
modernisation theory.82 In one of his last books, Ernest Gellner argued that 
Turkey deserves the special attention of anyone who is interested in the 
future of liberal societies, economic development and Islam. Among the 
Asian states, Japan, India and Turkey, with their success in constitutionalism 
and genuine elections, provide grounds for optimism for Western liberals. 
Within this trio Turkey stands out in several important aspects: Turkey was 
80  Anderson, Imagined communities, p. 85. 
81  Kemal H. Karpat, ‘Millet and nationality: The roots of the incongruity of nation and state in the post-
Ottoman era’, in Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis, eds, Christians and Jews in the Ottoman 
Empire: The functioning of a plural society, Vol. 1 (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1982), p. 151. 
82  See Suna Kili, Atatürk devrimi: Bir cağdaşlaşma modeli [Ataturk revolution: A model for 
civilisation] (Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası Yayınları, 1995); Mardin, Türk modernleşmesi; Robert E. 
Ward and Dankwart A. Rustow, eds, Political modernization in Japan and Turkey (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1964). 
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the first state to embark on the road to building a constitutional government 
despite its Islamic character. Gellner furthermore argued that Turkey’s 
commitment to modern political ideas was a result of an endogenous 
development, rather than being an exogenous imposition. Turkey was never 
colonised and Turkish nationalists achieved political modernity by choosing 
their own destiny. Yet, there is a dilemma arising from Gellner’s analysis, 
because he argued that Turkish commitment to modernisation of the polity 
and society had both an Ottoman and a Koranic quality.83  
This dilemma needs to be eliminated with further clarification: the Turkish 
nationalists’ commitment to modernisation was based on the rejection of their 
Ottoman predecessors. Although there was historical continuity between the 
modernisation attempts of the Young Ottomans, the Young Turks and the 
nationalists, Turkish and Ottoman modernisations presented themselves 
differently. While it was inevitable that Ottoman modernisation adopted some 
aspects of the Western experience, Turkish modernisation was by definition 
opposed to the Ottoman–Islamic experience and accepted Westernisation as a 
totality. With the emergence of Turkish nationalism, the modern Turkish 
nation’s past was Ottoman–Islamic and Central Asian, but its future was 
secular and European. Yet although Turkish modernisation aimed to cut its 
ties with the Ottoman past, it could not so easily destroy the Islamic quality of 
the Empire. This is probably why Gellner argued that Turkish modernisation 
had both an Ottoman and an Islamic quality.  
I challenge Gellner’s conclusion on two grounds: first, Turkish modern-
isation had a clear-cut break with Ottoman modernisation. The Turkish 
modernising elite aimed to change the Islamic character of the state in 
accordance with the secular character of European states. Second, Turkish 
modernisation was not only a result of internal developments. Gellner 
downplays the role of external pressures on the Empire. The Turkish elite’s 
commitment to modernisation was a consequence of both internal 
developments and external pressures from European powers. There is 
another dilemma at this stage of Turkish history: although the Turkish 
modernising elite accepted Westernisation as a totality they, interestingly 
enough, developed the nationalist ideology against the expansionist policies 
83  Ernest Gellner, Encounters with nationalism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), pp. 81–3. 
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of European powers. Therefore, the paradoxical character of Ottoman–
European relations took on a new meaning during the emergence of Turkish 
nationalism. The Turkish nationalists were, in fact, against both the 
imperialist Ottomans and Europeans. In particular, Turkish nationalism 
reached its peak when the Allied powers signed the Treaty of Sèvres with 
the Ottoman state in 1920.84  
The Treaty of Sèvres was ‘the origin of Turkish nationalism’ as described 
in a British Foreign Office report, which suggested that the treaty triggered 
nationalist feelings among the Turks.85 Despite the Allied powers’ expec-
tations of bringing a final solution to the problem of ‘the sick man of 
Europe’ it produced further complications. The Treaty of Sèvres was indeed 
a vindictive document which considered neither the needs of the Muslim 
subjects of the Empire—the Turks—nor the political or demographic 
realities of the Ottoman Empire. It represented the demands of the Allies 
first and those of the Christian subjects of the Empire—the Greeks and 
Armenians—second. The harsh treatment of the Turks in the treaty was an 
indication of Allied prejudice and self-interest. Britain, France and Italy 
easily neglected ethical matters such as self-determination and Woodrow 
Wilson’s Fourteen Points, since all wanted to gain the territories of the 
disappearing Ottoman Empire. It was a warning that the Allies had no 
intention of accepting the principle of national self-determination for the 
Muslim subjects of Anatolia. The Treaty of Sèvres, like the Treaty of 
Versailles with Germany, was the result of Allied concerns with the post-
war European order.  
Both were punitive treaties, imposed by victors who adopted a lofty 
moral tone to hide self-interest. Both treaties contained economic clauses 
intended to ensure that the vanquished would never rise again. Both 
84  The Treaty of Sèvres was signed on 10 August 1920 between Britain, France, Italy, Japan, Armenia, 
Belgium, Greece, the Hejaz, Poland, Portugal, Rumania, the Serbo-Croat-Slovene state, and Czecho-
Slovakia on the one part and Turkey on the other. There was an interesting dilemma in the Turkish 
case since Turkey was not regarded as a new state. Although the peace treaty was signed with the 
İstanbul government the participating side was defined as Turkey, not the Ottoman Empire. 
85  Outline of events in Transcaucasia from the beginning of the Russian revolution in the summer of 
1917 to April 1921, unpublished British Foreign Office documents, Public Record Office, Kew, 
London, FO 371/6269/E 8378/8378/58. 
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limited the military strength and territory of the loser. However, the 
Sèvres treaty was the harsher.86  
But the consequences of these treaties did not meet Allied expectations. 
The Kemalist nationalists were determined to fight against European 
imperialism in order to save the Ottoman Empire, which they actually 
wanted to get rid off. Despite the fact that they were also against the 
expansionist policies of the Europeans, they aspired to follow the existing 
Western model of state-building. 
The final neglected dimension of expansion of international society to 
the Ottoman Empire is that the socio-political transformation of the Empire 
into a modern nation-state based on the European model was, in essence, 
the last entry requirement of this society. As has been argued, during the 
Ottoman Empire people associated themselves with each other according to 
their religion in the millet system—i.e. Muslim subjects and non-Muslim 
subjects (Christians—Greeks and Armenians—and Jews) of the Empire. 
The replacement of the religious umma identity by a secular ‘national’ 
identity became necessary in accordance with the policies of modernisation. 
Under these conditions, the idea of a Turkish nation had to be constructed 
from scratch. More importantly, the construction of a Turkish nation had to 
be carried out by a semi-functioning state since there was no nation. It had 
to be carried out in two stages. First, the majority of Muslim Anatolian 
peasants had to become conscious of their Turkishness. Second, the 
nationalist group declared itself as a new government of the Turkish nation 
and claimed national self-determination over Ottoman territory in Anatolia 
as Turkish territory. The construction of the Turkish nation within the 
limited boundaries of a territorial-state necessitated the rejection by the 
nationalists of the imperial, expansionist policies of their predecessors. This 
indicated a radical change in Turkish identity politics. The nationalist elite 
focused on the territorial definition of a nation-state and abandoned the 
concern for Turks living outside the determined boundaries of the state, a 
preoccupation that had been at the core of previous ideologies, i.e. pan-
Islamism, pan-Turanism and pan-Turkism.  
86  Justin McCarthy, The Ottoman Turks: An introductory history to 1923 (London: Longman, 1997), 
p. 374. 
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The major test of the new nationalist policy materialised when Bolshevik 
control was established in Azerbaijan in 1920. Turkish nationalists stated 
that they were determined to restrict their policies within national borders 
and that they recognised the importance of establishing relations with the 
Bolsheviks. In the process of nation-building and state transformation, the 
Turkish-Bolshevik rapprochement played an important role in determining 
both new Turkey’s problematic borders with the Armenians and the state’s 
political identity through diplomatic means and mutual recognition in 1921. 
This rapprochement not only influenced the policies of the Allied powers in 
planning the Turkish and Russian settlements at the end of the First World 
War but also played an important role in solving the Turkish identity crisis, 
by facilitating the newly constructed Turkish nation-state’s participation in 
international society.87
The creation of a secular Turkish nation-state was again tested through 
diplomatic relations with European states. When the Allies invited the 
Ankara government to the peace conference at Lausanne in 1923 the 600-
year-old Ottoman Empire came to an end and the new Turkish nation-state 
sought to take its place with other members of European international 
society. The Ottoman Empire ceased being the ‘other’ when Turkey was de 
jure recognised by the British, French, Italian, Japanese, Greek, Romanian 
and Serbo-Croat-Slovene governments with the signing of the Treaty of 
Lausanne on 24 July 1923.88 The Ankara government gained full 
sovereignty of the Turkish nation-state within agreed territorial boundaries. 
On 29 October 1923, when the new Constitution declared the Turkish state 
a ‘republic’ with sovereignty coming from the nation, the new Turkish 
imagined community was defined as a ‘nation’ with de facto territorial 
sovereignty.89 The final stage of making the new Turkish nation homo-
87  See Ayla Göl, ‘The place of foreign policy in the transition to modernity: Turkish policy towards the 
South Caucasus’, unpublished PhD thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science, 
2000. 
88  Eighteen separate documents were signed between the contracting parties at Lausanne. Like the 
Treaty of Sèvres it was a detailed settlement, but was unlikely to be legalised in the creation of a new 
Turkish state. Reha Parla, ed., Belgelerle Türkiye Cumhuriyet’nin uluslararası temelleri: Lozan, 
Montrö ve Türkiye’nin komşularıyla imzaladığı başlıca belgeler (Suriye, İrak, İran, SSCB, 
Bulgaristan, Yunanistan) [The international foundations of the Turkish Republic in documents] 
(Lefkoşa: Tezel Ofset ve Matbaacılık, 1985), pp. 1–103. 
89  Smith, Theories of nationalism, p. 189. 
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geneous within the boundaries of the new state was completed when the 
Greek minorities of Anatolia were exchanged for the Muslims of Greece 
under the provisions of the agreement signed in Lausanne. In the final 
analysis, with the Lausanne settlement the Ottoman Empire finally ceased 
being the other and the modern Turkish state representing the homogeneous 
Turkish nation was mutually recognised by Western states. The admission 
of the new nation-state into the European society of states left no questions 
about the identity of Turkey and Turks. 
CONCLUSION  
This article has argued that the Ottoman Empire was never accepted as an 
equal member of European international society even though it was part 
of the European state system. Europeans needed the mirror image of the 
‘other’ in order to define their shared identity against it. The Ottoman 
Empire was the perfect candidate due to its geographical location on the 
margins of Europe and different socio-political structure. The Ottomans 
also defined their identity against the ‘infidels’, i.e. the Christian 
Europeans. As long as the Empire was powerful there was no need to have 
relations with the Christians. When the Empire started declining, the 
ruling elite decided to participate and accept the entry requirements of the 
European society of states. Its admission as the first non-European and 
non-Christian state to international society with the Treaty of Paris in 
1856 did not stop it functioning as the ‘other’ until the end of the First 
World War. Prior to the period of the cessation of diplomatic relations 
with European states, the powerful Islamic Empire did not involve the 
politics of European balance of power. After the Ottomans decided to 
participate in the European society of states they were transferred from 
being the ‘other’ to ‘the sick man of Europe’ as long as it served the 
interests of the Concert of Europe. 
Four important implications of the Ottoman Empire/Turkey’s partici-
pation in international society emerge from this analysis, which are largely 
neglected in the conventional English School literature. First, the identity 
dimension of international society within which the Ottoman Empire played 
an important role as a non-Christian and non-European other has not been 
emphasised until recently. The founding scholars of the English School 
were more interested in the role of religious politics than identity politics. 
The Empire’s ambiguous place in European politics challenges the claims 
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about the universal character of international society.  Second, the English 
School scholars do not pay attention to explain how an Islamic state’s 
socialisation into European international society affected its behaviour in 
domestic politics. The Ottoman Empire was the first to see how European 
concepts, institutions and norms would be compatible with Islam. Third, 
civilisational and normative discussions about the expansion of international 
society overlook the fact that the expansion of the European economy to 
foreign markets required the admittance of the Ottoman Empire, which led 
the Empire to promote its socio-political and economic modernisation. 
Fourth, the radical transformation of the Islamic Empire into a secular 
nation-state as the last entry requirement of international society has not 
totally changed its status as the other among European states. The Turkish 
nationalists rejected the identity of the Ottoman Empire and created a 
homogeneous territorial state based on the approved European national 
model at the end of the First World War. After the recognition of the secular 
Turkish nation-state by European states at Lausanne in 1923, they 
anticipated the discontinuation of being the other in European international 
society. However, the question still remains whether or not Turkey is 
considered a European member of international society. In particular, 
contemporary relations between Turkey and the European Union make us 
think that the status of Turkey as the ‘other’ is still continuing due to its 
Islamic and Ottoman characteristics, and consequently is contributing to the 
politics of exclusion between Turkey and European states. 
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